Case Western Reserve Law Review
Volume 53

Issue 1

Article 7

2002

The Limits of Police Power: State Action to Prevent Youth
Cigarette Use after Lorillard v. Reilly
Jamie Peal Kave

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev
Part of the Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Jamie Peal Kave, The Limits of Police Power: State Action to Prevent Youth Cigarette Use after Lorillard v.
Reilly, 53 Case W. Rsrv. L. Rev. 203 (2002)
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/caselrev/vol53/iss1/7

This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Journals at Case Western Reserve University
School of Law Scholarly Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Case Western Reserve Law Review by an
authorized administrator of Case Western Reserve University School of Law Scholarly Commons.

THE LIMITS OF POLICE POWER:
STATE ACTION TO PREVENT YOUTH
CIGARETTE USE AFTER
LORILLARD V. REILLY
INTRODUCTION

You are a voter in California who hears about a proposed referendum that would impose a higher tax on tobacco products. You
wonder what the point is. The initiators of the ballot proposal say
that the higher tax will prevent minors from having access to cigarettes. But why create a higher tax that will affect adults, when it's
illegal for minors to buy tobacco products and it's illegal for retail
stores to sell tobacco products to minors?' Shouldn't the laws
keep youth from smoking?
The answer to this question is no. Laws that prohibit minors
from buying tobacco are not effective, mainly because they are
underenforced.2 Almost every state in the nation has similar laws, 3
yet the youth in the United States still manage to obtain and consume over a billion packs of cigarettes per year. The Department
of Health and Human Services has estimated that 90% of smokers
begin using tobacco before they reach age twenty, 50% of smokers
begin using before they are fourteen, and 25% become addicted by
age twelve. There are many effects of cigarette smoking, and often these effects are irreversible. 6 Furthermore, the tobacco comOFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., STATE
TOBACCO ACTIVITIES TRACKING AND EVALUATION SYSTEM, at http://www2.cdc.gov/nccdphpl
osh/state (1998) [hereinafter TRACKING AND EVALUATION].
2 CTR. FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE PREVENTION,

DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV.,

THE SYNAR REGULATION: STRATEGIES FOR REDUCING SALES OF TOBACCO
PRODUCTS TO MINORS 2 (1998) [hereinafter IMPLEMENTING THE SYNAR REGULATION] ("The
IMPLEMENTING

challenge at hand is... enforcement ...").
3 See

COALITION

FOR

RESPONSIBLE

TOBACCO

RETAILING,

WE

CARD,

at

http:l/www.wecard.orglPages/statelaw.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002) (listing laws on tobacco
regulation for the 50 states and the District of Columbia).
4 AM. HEART ASS'N, TOBACCO INDUSTRY'S TARGETING OF YOUTH, MINORITIES AND

WOMEN, at http://www.americanheart.org/Heart-andStrokeAZGuide/tobta.html (2000).
5 Id.
6 PAUL H. BRODISH, AM. COUNCIL ON SCI. AND HEALTH, THE IRREVERSIBLE HEALTH
EFFECTS OF CIGARETTE SMOKING (1998).
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panies continue to encourage youth to smoke through a variety of
methods, including advertising directed at youth and promotional
activities.7
The issue of tobacco use by minors is a serious one which
cannot be ignored. As Philip R. Lee and David Satcher said in the
foreword to the Surgeon General's 1994 report on youth tobacco
use, "[p]reventing smoking and smokeless tobacco use among
young people is critical to ending the epidemic of tobacco use in
the United States." 8 If states can effectively prevent minors from
beginning to smoke, the rewards will be great for the entire society, and they will be evidenced by lower health care costs and a
smaller societal burden of caring for those who become ill from
smoking. 9 If youth cannot be dissuaded from smoking, it is likely
that they will inhale a combination of 4000 chemicals between
four and five million times throughout their lifetimes (the average
of a smoker who smokes for fifty years). 10
The courts have had a difficult history with the issue of state
and local tobacco regulation. The federal law that governs is the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (FCLAA), 11 which
contains a preemption provision that prevents states from taking
certain actions concerning smoking and health. 12 The circuit
13
courts have been split on the scope of this preemption provision.
In the recent case Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 14 the Supreme
Court resolved this split and set out certain actions of tobacco
See, e.g., John P. Pierce etal., Tobacco Industry Promotion of Cigarettes and Adolescent Smoking, 279 JAMA 511 (1998).
'

OFFICE ON SMOKING AND HEALTH, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERV., PRE-

VENTING TOBACCO USE AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL i

(1994) [hereinafter SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT]. Dr. Lee was the Assistant Secretary for
Health of the Public Health Service, while Dr. Satcher was the Director of the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. Id.
9 See TRACKING AND EVALUATION, supra note 1 (noting that, in California, the smokingrelated medical costs for 1993 were over $5.3 billion).
10 PETER D. JACOBSON ET AL., COMBATING TEEN SMOKING: RESEARCH AND POLICY
STRATEGIES 9 (2001).

" 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1998).
12 15 U.S.C. § 1334.
13 Compare Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d 100,
109 (2d
Cir. 1999) (holding that the majority of city's advertising law was not preempted by the FCLAA
because it only regulated location, not content), and Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives,
Inc. v. City of Chicago, 189 F.3d 633, 639-40 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that city's ordinance was
preempted by the FCLAA only to the extent that it regulated the content of tobacco advertising),
with Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dep't, 195 F.3d 1065, 1075 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a board of health's resolution banning outdoor tobacco advertising was preempted
by the FCLAA because content and location regulations are indistinguishable), and Vango
Media, Inc. v. City of New York, 34 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that ordinance requiring one antismoking message for every four tobacco advertisements was preempted by the
FCLAA).
14 533 U.S. 525 (2001).
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regulation that the states are prohibited from taking; however, the
Court failed to inform the states about what they were permitted to
do about the problem of youth smoking.
This Note will examine a variety of state regulations of underage use of tobacco, and it will determine what the states' options are to keep youth from using tobacco while still conforming
to the ruling in Lorillard.
I. YOUTH CIGARETTE CONSUMPTION AND THE LAW
A. Underage Smoking Concerns
Smoking directly causes one-sixth of all deaths in the United
States every year.' 5 It causes more American deaths than alcohol
abuse, AIDS, traffic accidents, homicides, and suicides combined,
resulting in a mortality rate of 420,000 smokers and 53,000 nonsmokers per year.16 In fact, the third leading cause of preventable death is
passive smoking, also known as second-hand smoke. 17 This is especially troublesome when one realizes that passive smoking is involuntary. 18 Smoking causes an increased risk of contracting coronary
heart disease, various types of cancers, chronic obstructive lung disease, and ulcers. 19 In addition, smokers are more likely to become
disabled.2 °
Smoking not only has adverse effects on a person's body, but
these effects may also be permanent, regardless of whether a person is
able to cease smoking. As Paul H. Brodish noted, "smoking cigarettes for as few as five years can have a permanent effect ...even if

15 MAURINE B. NEUBERGER, SMOKE SCREEN: TOBACCO AND THE PUBLIC WELFARE 15

(1963).

16 STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE CIGARETTE PAPERS xvii (1996). The smoking prob-

lem is not unique to the Unites States. In 1995, deaths from smoking in Canada were estimated
at 45,000. LAURA C. SNOWBALL & JAMES R. ROBERTSON, CANADA LAW AND GOV'T DIVI.,
LIBRARY OF PARLIAMENT, CURRENT ISSUE REVIEW 86-22E, TOBACCO SMOKING 3 (1996).

17 GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 437. However, the tobacco companies claim that
environmental pollution is the true cause of these deaths. Id. at 393. See also GIO B. GORI &
JOHN C. LUIK, PASSIVE SMOKE: THE EPA'S BETRAYAL OF SCIENCE AND POLICY vii (1999)

(asserting that the EPA's finding that environmental tobacco smoke is linked to cancer was done
without the benefit of careful scientific research" and was a "preconceived conclusion").
18 See ROBERT E. GOODIN, No SMOKING 69 (1989) ("You can voluntarily choose to do
something only if you can, realistically, choose not to do it; and no one can choose not to
breathe.").
19 NEUBERGER, supra note 15, at 14. A recent study by the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention indicated that each pack of cigarettes sold in the United States costs the country
$7.18 in medical care and lost productivity. See Erin McClam, A Pack of Cigarettes Costs U.S.
$7 in Care, Output, Study Shows, PLAIN DEALER, Apr. 12, 2002, at A19.
20 NEUBERGER, supra note 15, at 15. Between one and two million people are disabled as
a result of smoking. Id.
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the smoker quits." 21 Brodish says that smoking causes irreversible
health effects, resulting in death in around one-half of all regular
smokers.22 He states that even the decision to begin smoking is often
irreversible, since only 20% of smokers who try to quit actually succeed.23 These effects are particularly serious in adolescents. In addition to the previously mentioned diseases associated with smoking,
childhood use of cigarettes can cause respiratory illness and can slow
lung development and cause premature facial wrinkling. 24 Also, the
earlier a person begins using tobacco, the more time they have to use
25
the product and the heavier the usage is.
One study by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
found that youth smoking rates increased by nearly one-third between
1993 and 1998,26 contrasted with the progress that has been made in
decreasing smoking in the adult population.27 In 1994, over three
million teenagers smoked cigarettes.28 It is important to reduce this
number for health reasons, and also because cigarette usage is linked
to other detrimental behavior in youths, such as experimenting with
29
drugs, fighting, and engaging in high-risk sexual behaviors.
B. CigaretteAdvertising and Its Effect on Youth
Advertising plays an important role in whether minors choose to
smoke. A Journal of Marketing study in 1996 found that children are
three times as likely as adults to be affected by advertising.3 ° One of
the findings of the 1994 Surgeon General's report was that "advertising appears to increase young people's risk of smoking." 31 Adolescents tend to overestimate the number of youth and adults who
21

BRODISH, supra note 6, at 3.

Id.at 3, 5.
Id. at 13.
24 Id. at 6, 12.
25 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 8, at i. See also Laura A. Peracchio &
David Luna, The Development of an Advertising Campaign to Discourage Smoking Initiation
Among Children and Youth, J. ADVERTISING, Fall 1998, reprinted as How Do We Persuade
22

23

Children Not to Smoke?, in ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN: CONCEPTS AND CONTROVERSIES 211,

211 (M. Carole Macklin & Les Carlson eds., 1999) (predicting that at least 1000 of the 3000
children who begin smoking daily will die of tobacco-related disease).
26 BRODISH, supra note 6, at 4 (citing Robert G. Cummings & Paul Mitchell, Alcohol,
Smoking, and Cataracts,115 ARCHIVES OF OPHTHALMOLOGY 1296 (1997)).
27 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 8, at i.
28 Id. at 9.
29 Id. at 7.

30 See AM. HEART ASS'N, supra note 4.
"t SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 10. See also Richard J. Fox et al.,
Adolescents' Attention to Beer and Cigarette PrintAds and Associated Product Warnings, 1.
ADVERTISING, Fall 1998, reprinted in ADVERTISING TO CHILDREN: CONCEPTS AND
CONTROVERSIES, supra note 25, at 251, 268 ("Adolescents viewed a Joe Camel cigarette ad on

average for more than 16 seconds, longer than they viewed any other ad, and yet almost 25% of
them never fixated on the warning message.").
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smoke, a problem that is exacerbated by cigarette advertising. 32 This
causes minors to begin smoking because they believe that cigarettes
are easily obtained. 33 As one author says: "So long as smoking remains fashionable among adults it will be fashionable for teen-agers
to smoke." 34

The tobacco companies are aware of the health risks of smokand of the effect of advertising on minors. As early as 1973, in
an in-house memorandum, Mr. Claude Teagus, Jr., of R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co. stated "Our Company needs to take advantage of the
,,36
He reasoned
opportunity to market new youth brands of cigarettes.
that while the company should not influence non-smokers to smoke, it
should give teenagers the opportunity to use its brands. Teagus set
out an elaborate plan, examining everything from the rate of nicotine
absorption to the visual effect of the packaging, to create a new brand
that could be a tribute to both individuality and togetherness and that
could enhance self-image and encourage experimentation. 37 Although he acknowledged the "smoking-health controversy," Teagus
dismissed it because he thought that the risk made smoking more attractive to minors, since they view themselves as "immortal. 38
Today, tobacco companies are singing a different tune. Philip
Morris's website states, "We do not want children to smoke; youth
smoking is a problem and we want to be part of the solution. ' 39 The
Lorillard Tobacco Company website mentions its "commitment not to
market to youths, '40 and R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company's website
ing 35

says that the company "does not want children to smoke.",41 How-

ever, these publicity contentions are difficult to believe when one realizes that the tobacco industry needs to obtain 5,000 new smokers
daily to maintain its sales, due to the number of people who quit or

SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 192-93.
Id.
34 NEUBERGER, supra note 15, at 106.
" See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 201-02, 211-16 (asserting that tobacco companies' 1960s research aimed at finding a cigarette additive that would not cause cancer showed
that the industry knew of the health risks of smoking early on).
36 Claude E. Teagus, Jr., Research Planning Memorandum on Some Thoughts About New
Brands of Cigarettes for the Youth Market 11 (Feb. 2, 1973) (unpublished manuscript, used in
the case of Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73 (Cal. 1994), available at
http://www.library.ucsf.edu/tobacco/mangini/).
31 Id. at 1, 4-9.
38 Id. at 8.
9 PHILIP MORRIS U.S.A., YOUTH SMOKING PREVENTION, at http://www.philipmorris
usa.com/DisplayPageWithTopicca5o.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
40 LORILLARD TOBACCO Co., ADVERTISEMENTS, at http://www.lorillard.net/
responsibility.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).
32

33

41 R.J.

REYNOLDS

TOBACCO

Co.,

TOBACCO

ISSUES:

YOUTH

NON-SMOKING,

http://www.rjrt.com/TI/Tlyouthsmoking-cover.asp (last visited Sept. 1, 2002).

at
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die of smoking-related disease,42 a figure that has been estimated at
two million per year.43
C. A History of Tobacco Advertising Regulations
The history of regulating cigarette advertising is long and varied.
In fact, tobacco sellers were taxed before an income tax existed in the
United States, 44 although the purpose of these early taxes was to collect revenue for funding wars, not to prevent health problems.45
Many organizations recognized that tobacco should be regulated long
before regulation became the norm.46 In 1964, the Surgeon General
declared that smoking is hazardous to one's health.47 Congress then
persuaded the Federal Trade Commission to postpone the release of
its trade regulations, which would have required health warnings on
cigarettes, 4 so Congress could enact the FCLAA in 1965. 49 In 1996,
the Food and Drug Administration issued a final set of rules regulating tobacco and tobacco advertising, 50 which the Supreme Court later
51
found to be beyond the jurisdiction of the agency.
The major cases involving tobacco use and advertising were decided in the 1990's. Some cases involved the issue of whether the
FCLAA preempted common law claims, 52 while other cases focused
42

AM. HEART ASS'N, supra note 4.

43 ELIZABETH KEYISHIAN, EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW ABOUT
SMOKING 8 (Evan

Stark ed., 2000).
44 I.R.S. Revised Regulations Concerning Taxes on Tobacco, Snuff, and Cigars, Series 6,
No. 8 (1873).
45 Frank J. Chaloupka et a]., Taxing Tobacco: The Impact of Tobacco
Taxes on Cigarette
Smoking and Other Tobacco Use, in REGULATING TOBACCO 39,40 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen
D. Sugarman eds., 2001).
46 For example, the Parent Teacher Association passed
a resolution against tobacco use by
children in 1926. Tobacco Advertising and Children: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 105th Cong. 14 (1999) [hereinafter Tobacco Advertising and
Children Hearing] (statement of Shirley Igo, Vice President for Legislation, National Parent
Teacher Association).
47 U.S. SURGEON GEN.'S ADVISORY COMM., DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC., AND WELFARE,
SMOKING AND HEALTH 33 (1964).
4' H.R. REP. No. 89-449, Background
Information (1965), reprinted in 1965
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350, 235 1.
49 Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (amended
1969).
50 FDA Regulations Restricting the Sale and Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless
Tobacco to Protect Children and Adolescents, 21 C.F.R. §§ 801, 803, 804, 807, 820, 897 (1996).
5' See FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 123 (2000)
(acknowledging the seriousness of the youth smoking problem, but finding that the Federal
Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act does not give the FDA authority to regulate tobacco products).
52 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992)
(holding that
FCLAA preempted claims based on failure to warn and neutralization of warnings through
advertising, but did not preempt express warranty, intentional fraud and misrepresentation, or
conspiracy claims); see also Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d 100,
109 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding that the majority of city's advertising law was not preempted by the
FCLAA because it only regulated location, not content); Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of Chicago, 189 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that city's ordinance
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on whether state and local advertising regulations were preempted by
the FCLAA.53
In addition to the important cases decided on the issue, a major
event occurred with the signing of the Master Settlement Agreement
(MSA) of 1998.14 Several major tobacco companies and forty-six
state attorney generals agreed to settle suits in which the states were
seeking reimbursement for smoking-related medical costs; this was
done shortly after the other four states negotiated a similar agreement
with the companies. 55 The MSA prohibits advertising and promotional activities aimed at youth, requires the tobacco companies to
establish a national fund to finance youth-oriented tobacco educational programs, and mandates that the companies pay $206 billion
over the next twenty-five years to the states that they can spend on
youth education programs or other projects. 56 Some of the projects
the states have chosen to fund with these monies are health-related
programs and tobacco control programs. 57 In return for paying the
settlement monies and agreeing to comply with these terms, the tobacco companies received a discharge and release of all claims the
states had against them.5 8
The signing of the Master Settlement Agreement was controversial. Many believe that the advertising restrictions in the MSA are
neither understood nor enforced.59 Some experts in the field see the
agreement as giving in to the tobacco companies, believing that the
state governments should have enacted stronger laws without compromising with the tobacco industry. 60 David A. Kessler, former
was preempted by the FCLAA only to the extent that it regulated the content of tobacco advertising); Lindsey v. Tacoma-Pierce County Health Dep't, 195 F.3d 1065, 1075 (9th Cir. 1999)
(holding that a board of health's resolution banning outdoor tobacco advertising was preempted
by the FCLAA because content and location regulations are indistinguishable); Vango Media,
Inc. v. City of New York, 34 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that ordinance requiring one
antismoking message for every four tobacco advertisements was preempted by the FCLAA).
53 See, e.g., Chiglo v. City of Preston, 909 F. Supp. 675 (D. Minn. 1995) (finding that a
content-based advertising regulation was preempted by the FCLAA).
54 The Master Settlement Agreement and its amendments are available at
http://www.naag.org/tobac/cigmsa.rtf [hereinafter MSA].
55 U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, PUB. No. GAO-01-851, TOBACCO SETTLEMENT:
STATES' USE OF MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT PAYMENTS 8 (2001) [hereinafter GAO].
56

Id. at 3, 9. There are no restrictions on how the states can spend these funds. Id.

57 Id. at 6 (stating that 41% of the payments have been allocated to health programs and

7% to tobacco control programs).
51 Id. at 8.
59 See, e.g., Robert L. Kline, Tobacco Advertising After the Settlement: Where We Are and
What Remains to Be Done, 9 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 621, 621 (2000) (cautioning that much
remains to be done in making these restrictions effective).
60 See Global Settlement of Tobacco Litigation: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on
Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 105th Cong. 14 (1999) [hereinafter Global Settlement Hearing]
(statement of C. Everett Koop, Co-Chair, Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy and Public
Health) ("I am convinced that the settlement gives the tobacco industry practically everything it
wants, but does shortchange the public's health .... ").
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Commissioner of the Food and Drug Administration and co-chair of
the Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy and Public Health, has
said that the settlement is "fundamentally flawed .. it gives the industry what it desperately wants ...[i]t gives the industry financial
certainty. '' 6 1 However, others view the MSA as a step in the right
direction, since it is the largest civil settlement in U.S. history.62
II. THE CURRENT LAW
A. The FCLAA
The FCLAA was first enacted in 1965, and was amended in
1969.63 The purpose of the FCLAA is defined as informing the public of the health effects of smoking and protecting the national economy by avoiding "diverse, nonuniform, and confusing cigarette labeling and advertising regulations with respect to any relationship between smoking and health." 64 The FCLAA requires tobacco companies to place a Surgeon General's warning on each cigarette package
and advertising billboard 65 and to cease advertising through electronic
means.66 The FCLAA also requires annual reports from the Federal
Trade Commission and the Secretary of Health and Human Services.67 A violation of the FCLAA is a misdemeanor, punishable by a
68

$10,000 fine.
District courts may also grant injunctions to prevent
violations of the FCLAA. 6

The original version of the FCLAA contained a preemption provision that was modified by the 1969 amendment.70 This provision
currently states, "No requirement or prohibition based on smoking
and health shall be imposed under State law with respect to the adverId. at 15
GAO, supra note 55, at 3.
FCLAA, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965) (current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 13311341 (1994)).
64 15 U.S.C. § 1331. The accompanying House Report stated that there was a need for
uniform labeling so differing state laws would not "create chaotic marketing conditions and
consumer confusion." H. REP. No. 89-449, Labeling (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2350,2352.
65 15 U.S.C. § 1333.
6' 15 U.S.C. § 1335. In the 1970s and 1980s, tobacco companies got around this rule by
advertising in movie trailers and by getting their products placed in movies. This was curtailed,
though, after an advertisement for Kool cigarettes was shown at the beginning of Snow White
and the Seven Dwarfs. GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 363-64.
67 15 U.S.C. § 1337.
61 15 U.S.C. § 1338.
69 15 U.S.C. § 1339.
70 The narrower 1965 version read as follows: "No statement relating
to smoking and
health shall be required in the advertising of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in
conformity with the provisions of this Act." FCLAA, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965)
(current version at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1341 (1994)).
61

62
61
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tising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.",7' There had
been great debate over the meaning of the language in the current
preemption provision 72 until the Supreme Court recently ruled on its
73
scope in Lorillard.
B. Lorillard v. Reilly
The Lorillard case was a challenge to the validity of a set of
Massachusetts regulations 74 promulgated by that state's attorney general that placed limitations on tobacco advertising in that state.75
These regulations sought to eliminate deception in the way cigarettes
are marketed, sold, and distributed in an effort to decrease cigarette
use by minors. They made it an unfair or deceptive act to market
cigarettes by using self-service displays; by failing to keep cigarettes
out of customers' reach; by placing outdoor advertisements within a
1000-foot radius of a public playground, playground area of a public
park, or a secondary or elementary school; and by using point-of-sale
advertising that is lower than five feet from the floor in any retail
store that is within a 1000-foot radius of a public playground, playground section of a public park, or secondary or elementary school,
when the retail store is not an adults-only store.76
Tobacco manufacturers claimed that the regulations violated the
Supremacy Clause and the First and Fourteenth Amendments of the
United States Constitution.77 The United States District Court for the
District of Massachusetts found that the location restrictions were not
preempted 78 and that the outdoor advertising regulations did not violate the First Amendment. 79 The United States Court of Appeals for
7' 15 U.S.C. § 1334(b).
72 See, e.g., Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council, Inc. v. Giuliani, 195 F.3d 100, 109 (2d
Cir. 1999) (holding that the majority of city's advertising law was not preempted by the FCLAA
because it only regulated location, not content); Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v.
City of Chicago, 189 F.3d 633, 640 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that city's ordinance was preempted by the FCLAA only to the extent that it regulated the content of tobacco advertising);
Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New York, 34 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) (holding that ordinance
requiring one antismoking message for every four tobacco advertisements was preempted by the
FCLAA).
73 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001). See discussion infra Part l.B.
74 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 940, §§ 21.01-21.07, 22.01-22.09 (2000).
5 Lorillard,533 U.S. at 532.
76 tit. 940, §§ 21.01-21.07, 22.01-22.09.
77 Lorillard,533 U.S. at 537.
78 Id. ("[T]o read the preemption

provision to proscribe any state advertising regulation
enacted due to health concerns about smoking would expand Congress' purpose beyond a reasonable scope and leave States powerless to regulate in the area.").
79 Id. at 538 (using the CentralHudson test, see Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub.
Serv. Comm'n., 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980), to determine that all regulations except the point-ofsale ones advanced a substantial government interest and were narrowly tailored to avoid suppressing more speech than necessary).
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the First Circuit, however, held that the FCLAA preempts content
regulations, but not regulations relating to location. 80 The court of
81
appeals also rejected the First Amendment challenge.
The Supreme Court concentrated on the preemption issue, finding that it was necessary to address the First Amendment challenge
only with regards to regulations not preempted by the FCLAA. The
doctrine of preemption is based on the Supremacy Clause of the
United States Constitution, which states, "This Constitution, and the
Laws of the United States... shall be the supreme Law of the Land.
. . any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary
83
notwithstanding."
There are three types of preemption. The first type of preemption is express preemption, which occurs when a federal statute contains a clause that explicitly takes certain powers away from the
states. 84 For this type, courts must determine what the clause means
and if the clause is constitutional.85 The second type of preemption is
implied preemption, which occurs when a federal statute occupies a
field in a way that indicates that states may not act in that field.86
Here, a judge must also determine that the federal interest is so dominant that it would preclude state action. 87 The third type of preemption is conflict preemption, where it is either impossible to comply
with both the state and the federal statute, or where the state law
keeps Congress from achieving federal objectives.88
Preemption is often narrowly construed to keep Congress from
going into traditional areas of state power: 89 "[A]n express definition
of the pre-emptive reach of a statute ... supports a reasonable inference ... that Congress did not intend to pre-empt other matters. 90

Using this framework, the Court rejected the Attorney General's ar80

Id. at 538-39 (following the Second and Seventh Circuits, which determined that the

FCLAA's preemption provision is ambiguous). See Greater N.Y. Metro. Food Council, Inc. v.
Giuliani, 195 F.3d 100 (2d Cir. 1999); Fed'n of Adver. Indus. Representatives, Inc. v. City of
Chicago, 189 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1999).
83 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 539 (finding that the regulations are narrowly tailored because
store owners have many other ways to present the packaging of tobacco products).
82 Id. at 553-54. The Court addressed the First Amendment challenges to the smokeless
tobacco and cigar regulations, which are beyond the scope of this Note, and examined the cigarette sales practices regulations because no preemption challenge was made to them. Id. at 553.
83 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.

87

Caleb Nelson, Preemption, 86 VA. L. REV. 225, 226 (2000).
Id. at 227.
id.
Id.

88

Id. at 227-28.

89

See Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 545 (2001) (stating that the Court of

8

85
86

Appeals found a presumption against preemption since the regulations were related to zoning, a
traditional state area).
90 Id. at 541 (quoting Freightliner Corp. v. Myrick, 514 U.S. 280, 288 (1995)).

2002]

LIMITS OF POLICE POWER

guments that the regulations were not made "with respect to" advertising 91 and were not "based on smoking and health. 92 The Court
disagreed with the first argument, stating that "there is no question
about an indirect relationship between the regulations and cigarette
advertising because the regulations expressly target cigarette advertising., 93 The second argument was rejected because the Court found
that "the concern about youth exposure to cigarette advertising is intertwined with the concern about cigarette smoking and health. 94
The Court also dismissed
the content/location distinction used suc95
cessfully in other cases.
The Court ruled that the advertising regulations were preempted
by the FCLAA. 96 For the non-preempted sales practices regulations,
the Court found that there was no First Amendment violation because
the state chose a narrowly tailored method of achieving its substantial
interest of preventing underage access to tobacco.97 The Lorillard
Court held that the FCLAA preempts "only ... state regulations targeting cigarette advertising., 98 This leaves many areas of regulation
open to state and local governments to protect their children from the
harms associated with early addiction to cigarettes.
III. WHAT CAN STATES Do Now?
It is important that states have some power to prevent tobacco
use by minors. Edward 0. Correia, a professor at Northeastern University School of Law, has asserted that if only the federal government regulates cigarettes, "history has shown that the tobacco industry will have much more leeway." Professor Correia believes that
9' Id. at 546.
92

id.

93 Id. at 547.
94 Id. at 548.
9' Id. at 548-49 ("A distinction between the content of advertising and the location of
advertising in the FCLAA also cannot be reconciled with Congress' own location-based restriction, which bans advertising in electronic media, but not elsewhere."). Compare Chiglo v. City
of Preston, 909 F. Supp. 675, 678 (D. Minn. 1995) (holding that ordinance was preempted by
the FCLAA because it "regulates to minute detail, the content and appearance of all retail store
signs that relate to tobacco products"), with Penn Adver. of Baltimore, Inc. v. Mayor of Baltimore, 63 F.3d 1318, 1325 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that ordinance was not preempted because it
regulated the location, but not the content, of the advertisements).
96 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001).
The Supreme Court has
held that the FCLAA also preempts certain causes of action against tobacco companies, including claims based on failure to wam. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 524 (1992).
But see Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 80 (Cal. 1994) (holding that claims
of unfair business practices and unjust enrichment involving manufacturer's advertising campaign supposedly targeted at minors were not preempted by the FCLAA).
97 Lorillard, 533 U.S. at 569 (finding that regulations prohibiting self-service and other
displays leave many communication avenues open to tobacco companies and that unattended
tobacco displays provide an opportunity for underage access).
98 Id. at 550.

CASE WESTERN RESERVE LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 53:203

states and localities are "quite willing" to regulate the tobacco industry and that they will enact "substantial restrictions on the advertising
99
and marketing of cigarettes, particularly to children."
The main challenge that can be asserted against many of these
state methods of regulation is that they violate the constitutional right
to free speech. 00 Since the regulations suggested all involve a commercial pursuit, the sale of cigarettes, the Central Hudson'°' test will
apply. This test recognizes that commercial speech gets less protection than political speech under the First Amendment, but that it is
still protected. Regulations of commercial speech are valid if the following four-part test is satisfied: (1) the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading; (2) there is a substantial government interest; (3) the regulation directly advances that interest; and (4) the
02
regulation is not broader than it needs to be to address that interest.
However, some have argued that the test should not apply to cases
involving protection of youth, based on the idea that commercial
speech protection "should be limited to those cases in which adult
access to advertising is at issue and should not be applied when governments use reasonable measures to restrict children's exposure to
advertisements for harmful products - in particular, products that may
not be legally sold to children."'' 0 3 Justice Stevens expressed a similar
view in his Lorillard concurrence, stating that he would have given
Massachusetts more latitude because the rules would have "only the
slightest impact on the ability of adults to purchase a poisonous product and may save some children from taking the first step on the road
to addiction."'1' 4
Although the Lorillard Court did not give specific guidelines on
how states can protect their youth from tobacco, the Court mentioned
some areas in which states have the authority to regulate. For example, the Court said that "States remain free to enact generally applicable zoning regulations, and to regulate conduct with respect to cigarette use and sales."' 5 In Lorillard,the Court also said that the language of the preemption provision "still leaves significant power in
99 Edward 0. Correia, State and Local Regulation of Cigarette Advertising, 23 J. LEGIS. I,
1(1997).
10 U.S. CONST. amend. 1.

101Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
102

id.

'0- Donald W. Garner & Richard J. Whitney, Protecting Children from Joe Camel and His
Friends:

A New First Amendment and Federal Preemption Analysis of Tobacco Billboard

Regulation, 46 EMORY L.J. 479, 485, 551 (1997) (suggesting that greater deference should be
given to the government when regulating commercial speech that is harmful to children) (emphasis omitted).
104 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 605 (2001) (Stevens, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
'o'Id. at 550.
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the hands of States ...to regulate conduct."'10 6 When these permissible areas are combined with what states cannot do, according to the
Lorillardholding, it is evident that there are many options left for the
states to pursue their
goals without walking into an area that the
07
FCLAA preempts.1
A. FinancialMeasures
The tobacco industry's market for underage smoking is about $1
billion per year. 10 8 It follows that a major way to get tobacco companies to cease targeting youths is to give them an economic incentive,
even though the major tobacco manufacturers deny marketing toward
minors:1°9 "If the companies actually do not want to have underaged
customers, then.., they should be glad to at least forego any income
made from products used by those customers."110 What follows are a
variety of ways of preventing youth smoking through economic
measures aimed at the smoking population, the tobacco industry, and
cigarette retailers.
First, states can enact financial control by influencing the behavior of the smoking population. States have continued their traditional
method of controlling cigarette use by minors through excise taxes. 11
This is an important regulatory area for the states to take advantage of
because increases in the price of cigarettes reduce cigarette smoking,
and youth are as susceptible to price changes as adults.' 12 Vermont
Attorney General Bill Sorrell agrees, saying that the increase in cigarette prices since 1997 has discouraged use by teenagers, and that
youth are more susceptible to price changes than adults are. 1 3 The
economic principle of price elasticity is what determines whether a
"0 ld. at 55 1.
See, e.g., Mangini v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 875 P.2d 73, 83 (Cal. 1994) ("Congress left the states free to exercise their police power to protect minors from advertising that
encourages them to violate the law.").
108John Slade, Marketing Policies, in REGULATING TOBACCO, supra note 45, at 72, 100.
109 See discussion supra Part I.B.
107

110 Slade, supra note 108, at 100.

...TRACKING AND EVALUATION, supra note 1. In fact, the first state tobacco tax was
passed by Iowa in 1921. Jack Nicholl, Tobacco Tax Initiatives to Prevent Tobacco Use, 83
CANCER 2666, 2666 (1998). As of September 1998, all 50 states and the District of Columbia
had an excise tax on cigarettes, ranging from 2.5 cents per pack in Virginia to $1.00 per pack in
Alaska and Hawaii. Id. at 2666-67. Recently, Maryland gubernatorial candidate Kathleen
Kennedy Townsend has proposed a cigarette tax increase of 36 cents. Lori Montgomery, Townsend Endorses Higher Tax on Tobacco, WASH. POST, Aug. 7, 2002, at B 1. If she succeeds in
getting this tax increase, Maryland's cigarette tax would become $1.36 per pack, one of the
highest in the United States. Id.
112 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 178. However, tobacco
taxes have
historically been passed based on the perception that tobacco sales are immune to price changes.
Chaloupka et al., supra note 45, at 39.
'" National Association of Attorneys General, 47 Attorneys General Cite Decline in Youth
Smoking as Sign of Progress,at http://www.naag.org/features/youth-smoking.cfm (2001).
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tax will be effective.' 14 Price elasticity is a measure of how sensitive
demand for a product is to changes in price.11 5 It can be defined as a
proportion of the percentage change in quantity purchased to the percentage change in price.' 16 Therefore, the higher the absolute value of
the price elasticity, the more effective a tax is. 117 In one study, researchers found that the price elasticity for young people was -0.906
to -1.309,'18 noting that this range is about three times the -0.4 estimate of price elasticity for adults.' 1 9 Another study found that price
elasticity of demand for cigarettes is -0.11 for males between the ages
of twenty-five and forty-four and -0.07 for males over age fortyfour. 120 The differences between these two sets of price elasticity
numbers suggest that price elasticity with respect to cigarette purchases is higher for youth than for adults, and therefore that youth are
more susceptible to cigarette price changes than adults are: "This
suggests that increases in cigarette excise taxes, which would increase
cigarette prices, are a very effective means of reducing cigarette
smoking among young adults. 121 Because of this, even a small
change in the price of cigarettes would help reduce youth smoking.
Tax initiatives can be instrumental for getting tobacco taxes into
law. Initiatives are voter-initiated petitions used to get a proposed
law onto the ballot. 122 The basic process consists of drafting the law,
123 These initiatives
collecting signatures, and campaigning for votes.
24
are permitted in twenty-four states and the District of Columbia;
other states do not allow this option for passing an excise tax. One
major early tax initiative was Proposition 99, a successful California
by 25 cents. 125
measure that raised the tax on each pack of cigarettes
This law prompted other states to attempt passage of tobacco tax initiatives, with varying degrees of success. Of the seven other states
examined in one article, almost half (three out of seven) succeeded in
passing tobacco tax initiatives, often against amazing opposition by
1"4

WALTER NICHOLSON, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS AND ITS APPLICATION 122

(5th ed. 1990).
15
116
17

id.
id.
id.

"8 Frank J. Chaloupka & Henry Wechsler, Price, Tobacco Control Policies and Smoking

Among Young Adults, 16 J. HEALTH ECON. 359, 369 (1997).
" Id.at 370.
120 Robert L.

Ohsfeldt et al., Tobacco Taxes, Smoking Restrictions, and Tobacco Use, in

THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF SUBSTANCE USE AND ABUSE 15, 25 (Frank J. Chaloupka et al.

eds., 1999).
121 Chaloupka & Wechsler, supra note 118 at 370.
122 Nicholl, supra note 111, at 2667.
123

id.

124

Id.
id.

125

20021

LIMITS OF POLICE POWER

the tobacco industry. 126 In this study, which compared the effectiveness of eight states' approaches to ending teenage tobacco use, researchers found that certain factors, including campaign leadership,
financial resources, and expert advice, distinguished
a successful tax
27
initiative campaign from an unsuccessful one.'
One problem with the use of excise taxes is the cigarette industry's control over the pre-tax price of cigarettes. For example, in
April 1993, one manufacturer reduced the price of its major brand by
40 cents; then, in August of that year, the industry announced a per128
manent price reduction of 39 cents for all premium cigarettes.
This, then, undermined the 26-cent tax increase that Massachusetts
had previously implemented.129 One possible solution to this problem
is to tax tobacco products on a graduated scale based on tar and nicotine content. 30 Another idea is that states could link the amount of
tax to the price, raising the tax as the tobacco companies attempt to
avoid it.
Another potential problem of preventing underage use of tobacco
with excise taxes is that there is debate over the magnitude and effectiveness of such a tax. First, there is a question as to the magnitude of
tax needed. According to MIT professor Jeffrey Harris, it would take
a tax of more than $2.00 before there would be an effect on teen
smoking rates.' 31 A Canadian tax reduced consumption by 30%, but
that tax was around $3.00 per pack. 132 Second, there is a dispute over
the effectiveness of using an excise tax. Not only is there a possibility that an excise tax will not reduce exposure to smoking's harmful
effects, but there are also concerns that excise taxes have a disproportionate effect on the poorer segment of34society 133 and that they might
be seen as a punishment for addiction.
A second method of financial control is to' focus on the tobacco
companies. States could levy a fine against the tobacco companies if
126
127
128

Id. at 2668-75.
Id. at 2676-78.
J.E. Harris et al., Cigarette Smoking Before and After an Excise Tax Increase and an

Antismoking Campaign - Massachusetts, 1990-1996, 45 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY.

REP.966, 967 (1996).
129 Id. at 967-68.
130 See GLANTZ ET AL., supra note 16, at 249-50 (discussing a 1972 New York City ordinance that taxed based on cigarette content).
131 Nicholl, supra note 111, at 2676.
'32Id. at 2667.
133 See Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman, Perspectiveson Policy: Introduction, in

REGULATING TOBACCO, supra note 45, at 3, 5 ("[Als smoking has come to be disproportionately a lower-income activity in our society, poorer people who continue to smoke would actually bear the heaviest burden of a tax increase.").
134Id. (asserting that if addiction is powerful, people are likely to buy cheaper brands and
smoke fewer cigarettes in more dangerous ways).
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youth smoking does not decrease that year by a predetermined
amount. 135 States could disallow the sale of single cigarettes, which
can be purchased for as little as 15-20 cents apiece. 136 States can also
use other measures to curb teenage smoking, such as taxing cigarette
samples,'137 taxing billboards, 138 and having minimum prices on cigarettes. 39 However, some of these methods create legal issues. For
example, taxing billboards may violate the tobacco company's right
to free speech under the United States Constitution.14 0 Also, having
minimum prices on cigarettes could be challenged as interfering with
fair trade laws. In Drink, Inc. v. Babcock,14 1 the Supreme Court of
New Mexico found that mandatory mark-ups for liquor sales were
unconstitutional. However, in Simonetti, Inc. v. State,142 the Supreme
Court of Alabama found that a law prohibiting cigarette sales at less
than cost was constitutional because it had an intent requirement.
Similarly, minimum price statutes for cigarettes might be seen as interfering with fair trade, depending on the mental state and elements
required to prove a violation.
A third method is financial control directed at retailers, which
could also prove effective. Retailers play a large role in whether minors have access to cigarettes. One state even found that laws prohib143
iting sale of cigarettes to minors are "almost universally ignored."'
One way of dealing with this problem is to give retailers an incentive
to refrain from selling to youth. Ultimately, this incentive needs to be
greater than the profit the merchants will earn from illegal underage
sales. 1' Requiring the store to have a license to sell tobacco and then
revoking that license if it sells to minors is one approach for ensuring

135See Global Settlement Hearing, supra note 60, at 18 (prepared joint statement of Dr. C
Everett Koop and Dr. David A. Kessler, Co-Chairs, Advisory Committee on Tobacco Policy
and Public Health).
136 IMPLEMENTING THE SYNAR REGULATION, supra note 2, at 12.
137 See, e.g., GA. COMP. R. & REGS. r. 560-8-6-.14 (2001).
138 See, e.g., St. Louis Poster Adver. Co. v. City of St. Louis, 249 U.S. 269, 274 (1919) ("If
the city desired to discourage billboards by a high tax we know of nothing to hinder, even apart
from the right to prohibit them altogether."). But see discussion infra Part HI.B.
139 See, e.g., S.D. ADMIN. R. 64:44:01:02 (1995).
140 See Minneapolis Star and Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575,
592-93 (1983) (holding that a state tax on paper and ink used for publications violated the First
Amendment because it targeted the press and was therefore a significant burden on freedom of
the press). However, it could be argued that billboard taxes do not single out the press, but
instead are directed at businesses in general.
14' 421 P.2d 798 (N.M. 1967). The court found that, although the purpose of the provision
was to prevent below-cost sales, the law was actually a price-controlling mechanism that would
assure a profit for retailers. Id. at 802-03.
142 132 So. 2d 252 (Ala. 1961). The court stated that the legislature's intention.was to
prevent monopolies, and found that that action was within the state's police power. Id. at 261.
143LEGIS. Doc. No. 77, at 17 (N.Y. 1964).
144 See discussion infra Part llI.C.
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that stores comply with the law. 145 Requiring employees to make
statements indicating an understanding46 of the illegality of selling
cigarettes to minors is another method. 1
B. Advertising Regulations
Advertising is a powerful tool that the tobacco industry appreciates as a way of increasing sales. In 1997, the industry spent $5.66
billion on cigarette advertising and promotion, representing an increase of 10.8% from the previous year. 147 In fact, a pack of Marlboro cigarettes costs only 16 cents to make, but marketing costs for
that pack are 55 cents. 48 Lorillard, however, limits state regulation
of advertising to prevent underage use of tobacco. This decision held
that Massachusetts's laws limiting outdoor advertising were preempted by the FCLAA, and decided that the point-of-sale advertising
regulations were an invalid impingement on First Amendment
rights. 49 The Court upheld the portion of the Massachusetts law that
required retailers to keep tobacco behind the counter. 15 However,
states still have some power to regulate cigarette advertising. 1 1 This
power can be exercised through the following methods: counteradvertising,l 52 zoning regulations, laws concerning promotional samples, and regulation of magazine sales.
Youth smoking is dependent upon advertising. 53 George Washington Hill, the man once in charge of marketing Lucky Strike cigarettes, stated: "The impetus of those great advertising campaigns...
built the cigarette business ....

',,

54 The drafters of the FCLAA rec-

ognized this problem, too, saying: "Some cigarette advertising in past
years has been objectionable, particularly in its appeals to young peo-

145 IMPLEMENTING THE SYNAR REGULATION, supra note 2, at 10-11.
'46 Id. at 12.
147 FED. TRADE COMM'N, 1997 REPORT TO CONGRESS PURSUANT TO THE
CIGARETrE LABELING AND ADVERTISING ACT 7 (1999) [hereinafter FTC REPORT].
148 Slade, supra note 108, at
72.
149 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 550, 566 (2001).
'I

FEDERAL

/d. at 568-69.

Id. at 551 ("[Tjhere is no indication that Congress intended to displace local community
interests in general regulations of the location of billboards ... or... intended cigarette advertisers to be afforded special treatment in that regard.").
152 See discussion infra Part lI.E.
153 One study partly attributed lack of progress in keeping youth from smoking
to increased tobacco advertising. Linda G. Pucci et al., Outdoor Tobacco Advertising in Six Boston
Neighborhoods, 15 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED. 155, 155 (1998). But see Michael Schudson,
Symbols and Smokers: Advertising, Health Messages, and Public Policy, in SMOKING POLICY:
LAW, POLITICS, AND CULTURE 208, 208-09 (Robert L. Rabin & Stephen D. Sugarman eds.,
1993) [hereinafter SMOKING POLICY] (asserting that advertisements do not change behavior, but
are instead aimed at people who already use the product to effectuate a change in brands).
'I'

154 NEUBERGER, supra note 15, at 29.
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pie." 155 Cigarette advertising is so powerful that the characteristics
associated with a particular brand can be transformed merely by
changing marketing strategies. 56 Youth are especially susceptible to
advertising. In a study of cigarette advertising exposure of Boston
schools, researchers found that sixteen of twenty-six elementary
schools, all eight middle schools, and three of the four high schools
studied were exposed to tobacco advertising. 15 7 They also found that
the five brands most smoked by youth were the subject of 77% of the
advertising near the schools. 158
The Court acknowledged that traffic safety and aesthetics can be
valid interests to justify state zoning laws regarding advertising, giving billboards and large marquee advertising as examples of advertising that local governments can regulate. 159 But there is a requirement
that these size and location restrictions be applied equally to cigarettes and to other products. 6° For instance, in Metromedia, Inc. v.
City of San Diego, , the Supreme Court decided that a city could not
enact an ordinance that limited the contents of billboards to exclude
noncommercial messages. The Court stated: "The fact that the city
may value commercial messages relating to onsite goods and services
more than it values commercial communications relating to offsite
goods and services does not justify prohibiting an occupant from displaying its own ideas or those of others.' ' 162 Similarly, a state probably cannot pass billboard regulations that prohibit certain cigarette
advertisements simply because it does not value smoking.
States can also impose limits on promotional items and samples
and require the use of pamphlets containing advice on how to quit
smoking. For instance, some states make it illegal for tobacco companies to distribute promotional samples of tobacco products to people under age eighteen, 163 while other states restrict this practice but
do not prohibit it.164 This is important, because at least one study has
found that a promotional item or free sample often provides the final
155 H.R. REP. No. 89-449, Advertising (1965), reprinted in 1965 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2350,

2353.

See NEUBERGER, supra note 15, at 35 (discussing the transformation of Marlboro cigarettes' image from "mild as May" to a "message of masculinity" through an advertising campaign).
157Pucci et al., supra note 153, at 156 (citing findings from a study where an exposed
school was defined as one where tobacco advertising was present within a 1000-foot radius of
the school).
"' Id. at 158.
159Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001).
156

160 Id.

16' 453 U.S. 490 (1981).
162 Id. at513.
163 See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:91.6 (West 1988).
164

See, e.g., TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1504 (1994 & Supp. 2001).
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incentive required to get someone to adopt a certain behavior, such as
smoking. 165 States can also possibly require package inserts that give
advice to consumers on how to quit smoking 166 or require placement
of pamphlets containing such advice in close proximity to cigarette
displays.
A major problem remaining in cigarette advertising is the prevalence of advertisements of cigarettes in magazines with a wide youth
readership. This problem exists even though cigarette companies
have agreed to guidelines that would keep them from placing ads in
magazines with a 15% readership (or two million readers) under age
eighteen. 167 Magazine ads account for 46% of all cigarette advertising.' 68 California Attorney General Bill Lockyer has estimated that
minors between the ages of twelve and seventeen see at least fifty
cigarette ads in magazines per year. 69 One study found that the top
five brands used by twelve- to fifteen-year-olds were the same five
brands that Massachusetts youth were most often exposed to in magazines.'
The researchers concluded that "cigarette advertising influences youth smoking behavior ...[and] efforts to eliminate or restrict
cigarette advertising to prevent youth tobacco use are justified.""17
One argument against state regulation of magazine advertisements is that direct regulation could create chaos with the national
magazine system, causing a plethora of divergent laws to which the
magazines will have to conform. However, states might be able to
use their police power to declare magazines with cigarette advertisements dangerous to the health of youth and require retailers to keep
such magazines behind the counter, 17 2 as is done now with certain
adult magazines. 73 This, in turn, would give magazines an incentive
165 See Pierce etal., supra note 7, at 514 (finding that the presence of one of these two
factors is often necessary to maximize the probability that smoking will occur).
166 See Slade, supra note 108, at 99 (describing a similar use of package inserts in Canada).
167 Ads for three major tobacco companies appear frequently in magazines
such as People,
Rolling Stone, TV Guide, and Sports Illustrated. Alex Kuczynski, Tobacco Companies Accused
of Still Aiming Ads at Youth, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 2001, at Al.
168 Linda G. Pucci & Michael Siegel, Exposure to Brand-Specific CigaretteAdvertising
in
Magazines and Its Impact on Youth Smoking, 29 PREVENTIVE MED. 313, 313 (1999). But see
FTC REPORT, supra note 147, at 7 (finding that, although it represented only 4.2% of advertising costs for 1997, magazine advertising cost the tobacco industry $237 million that year).

169 Kuczynski, supra note 167, at Al.

170Pucci & Siegel, supra note 168, at 316.
171 Id. at 319.
172 However, this might be found to be overbroad under the Central Hudson test. Cent.
Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).
173See ARtz. REV. STAT. § 13-3507 (2001) (making it illegal to knowingly display explicit
sexual material publicly). "Explicit sexual material" includes magazines that expose human
genitalia or depict sexual activity, and "public display" includes display on racks and "in any
place where minors are invited as part of the general public." Id. See also Berry v. City of
Santa Barbara, 47 Cal. Rptr. 2d 661 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996) (holding that an ordinance that re-
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to cease placing cigarette ads in their publications, so they could get
their magazines placed out in the open, where people can read them
and more easily buy them. A narrower option is for states to conduct
surveys in order to discover which popular magazines teenagers read
and limit the display of these publications, thus insuring that only the
magazines with high teenage readership are regulated. 174 This last
idea would probably regulate in a way that would 75be no broader than
necessary to achieve the goal of protecting youth.
A second problem with state magazine regulation is that the tobacco industry could challenge such a regulation under the Dormant
Commerce Clause. This clause encompasses the implicit idea that
states are limited in what they can do with regards to regulating interstate commerce; however, states are permitted to make laws governing local matters that somewhat affect interstate commerce. 176 The
Massachusetts Tobacco Ingredients and Nicotine Yield Act, which
requires cigarette manufacturers to disclose the additives they use,
was upheld as not violating the Dormant Commerce Clause by the
United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit because no less
burdensome alternatives were available, and the disclosure was likely
to benefit the Massachusetts public.' 77 The same standard of upholding a state law unless the burden on commerce is "clearly excessive"
of local benefits is used when a state's regulation applies indiscrimi78
nately and will have only incidental effects on interstate commerce.
A total ban on tobacco advertising is another possible way to
prevent minors from smoking cigarettes. 79 In fact, at least twentyseven countries, including Canada and France, have passed total bans
on cigarette advertising. 80 Partial bans have been called worthless by
some, who say that limiting advertising does "little or nothing to required adult magazines to have only one-third of their covers displayed did not violate the First
Amendment of the United States Constitution).
171 See Tobacco Advertising and Children Hearing, supra note 46, at 52 (statement of
Alfred Munzer, Past President, American Lung Association, and Director of Critical Care and
Pulmonary Medicine, Washington Adventist Hospital).
175 See United States v. Edge Broad. Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429-30 (1993) (holding that statute
prohibiting lottery advertisement broadcasting to states that forbid lotteries, while allowing such
broadcasts to states supporting lotteries was no broader than necessary to achieve the government's interest); see also Central Hudson, 447 U.S. 557.
176 Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly, Nos. 00-2425, 00-2449, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22348, at
*13 (1st Cir. Oct. 16, 2001) (originally published in advance sheet at 267 F.3d 45; but withdrawn from bound volume at request of court) (upholding the Massachusetts law despite challenges of categorical and regulatory takings of trade secrets).
17 Id. at '16-17.
178 Id. at *13 (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
179See, e.g., SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 192 (stating that Finland has
had a total ban on tobacco advertising since 1978).
180 Robert A. Kagan & William P. Nelson, The Politics of Tobacco Regulation in the
United States, in REGULATING TOBACCO, supra note 45, at 10, 31.
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duce tobacco product use because advertising simply migrates to the
still permitted outlets." '' While this total ban might seem preferable
to the regulations the United States employs, it would be a difficult
law to pass in this country because of the rights to freedom of choice
and freedom of speech. 182 In fact, the Supreme Court has affirmed a
decision finding a total ban on contraceptive advertising unconstitutional. 183 The Court has also held, in 44 Liquormart,Inc. v. State of
Rhode Island,184 that a complete ban on alcohol price advertising violated the First Amendment guaranty of free speech. Therefore, a
complete ban on cigarettes will probably not pass muster.
C. Monitoring
Sale of tobacco products to minors is common.' 85 In 1988, sales
to minors resulted in over $221 million of the tobacco industry's profits from its total domestic sale of 560.7 billion cigarettes. 186 Four major forms of monitoring can be useful for keeping teenagers from
smoking: (1) licensing requirements for stores selling cigarettes, (2)
laws governing the placement of cigarette vending machines, (3) direct monitoring of retail outlets to insure that cigarettes are not being
illegally sold to minors, and (4) use of innovative devices and new
technologies in age verification. These four methods could fall into
the category mentioned by the Supreme Court that involves "other
means of regulating
conduct" that state and local governments have at
87
their disposal. 1
First, licensing requirements are important. Among the reasons
for requiring a license to sell cigarettes are that the license can be re88
voked or a large fine can be levied if the store sells to minors.'
Unfortunately, nearly one-third of the states have no retail licensing
laws whatsoever. 189 Where used, however, the licensing approach is
helpful in solving various problems. Not only can it help reduce sales
to minors, but it can also be a source of funding for the state's
181 Slade, supra note 108, at 95.
U.S. CONST. amend. .
183Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 701-02 (1977) (stating that advertising
182

merely informs people of the availability of products that are legal and constitutionally protected).
"4 517 U.S. 484, 507-08 (1996) (finding that the statutory ban did not survive the Central
Hudson test for commercial speech).
... SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 10.

186 FIC REPORT, supra note 147, at 13; J.C. Romeis et al., Minors'
Access to Tobacco Missouri, 1992, and Texas, 1993, 42 MORBIDITY AND MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 125, 127
(1993).
187 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 552 (2001).
188 Romeis et al., supra note 186, at 127.
89 TRACKING AND EVALUATION, supra note 1 (showing map of licensing laws as of Sep-

tember 1998).
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enforcement or educational programs, increasing the costment or educational programs, increasing the cost-effectiveness of
preventing sales to youth.190
Second, vending machine placement can be regulated. Such a
regulation is needed because minors are often successful in purchasing cigarettes from vending machines, which are usually unsupervised. 19' A variety of vending machine laws are currently in place,
but strict laws are used in less than half of the states.192 Although no
state currently has a ban on cigarette vending machines, the City of
Boston recently has proposed one. 193 More creative ways of curbing
underage cigarette purchase from vending machines are prohibiting
the sale of food or novelty items in the same machine as cigarettes,
requiring a purchase of tokens from a cashier to use the machines, and
mandating
the use of locking devices that only a clerk can deacti94
vate. 1
Third, direct monitoring is a useful way of determining the number and type of stores that often sell to minors. 195 Two recent studies
found that purchase attempts by minors were successful 46.1% of the
time in Missouri and 62.8% in Texas.196 To solve this problem,
monitoring should occur and there should be laws mandating the
placement of signs that say cigarettes will not be sold to minors. 197 In
one successful Massachusetts program, merchant compliance with
laws prohibiting sale to minors improved after the implementation of
frequent monitoring. The success rate for attempted purchases by
minors fell from 48% to 8% under this program. 198 Monitoring can
190 Nancy A. Rigotti, Reducing the Supply of Tobacco to Youths, in REGULATING ToBACCO, supra note 45, at 143, 151.
191 In a Florida study, minors successfully purchased cigarettes from vending machines
one-third of the time (and in this study, the minors went to the counter to ask someone for
change for the machine before attempting to purchase!). F.S. Bridges & B.S. Graves, Accessibility to Minors of Cigarettesfrom Vending Machines-Broward County, Florida, 1996, 45
MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 1036, 1036-37 (1996).
92 See TRACKING AND EVALUATION, supra note 1. Vending machines are regulated more
than other methods of selling cigarettes. Over 40 states had some kind of regulations regarding

the placement and supervision of cigarette vending machines as of September 1998. Id.
193 Raja Mishra, Officials Target CigaretteSales, BOSTON GLOBE, Feb.14, 2002, at B 1.
194 IMPLEMENTING THE SYNAR REGULATION, supra note 2, at 11-12. However, one problem with purchasing tokens is the possibility that adults will buy the tokens and then give them
to minors.

195 See Pamela . Clark et al., Factors Associated with Tobacco Sales to Minors, Lessons
Learned from the FDA Compliance Checks, 284 JAMA 729, 732-33 (2000) (reporting that
requests for proof of age were associated with denying sale to minors, that suburban and rural
retailers sold to minors more frequently than urban ones, and that sales rates were highest in gas

stations, as opposed to in other stores).
196 Romeis et al., supra note 186, at 126-27.
197 Kentucky requires stores to post similar signs. 302 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 78:020,(2001).
198 Gregory Connolly & Harriet Robbins, Designing an Effective Statewide Tobacco Control Program-Massachusetts,83 CANCER 2722, 2725 (1998).
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also be used to curb shoplifting, which is a common method used by
underage smokers to obtain cigarettes. 99
Direct monitoring has the potential for being extremely successful. The basic idea behind monitoring storeowners is that of expected
value, which is the average outcome of an uncertain event. 2z ° A
storeowner will evaluate whether selling to minors will be advantageous by multiplying the probability that he will get caught by the
magnitude of the possible fine. Then he can compare that number
with the profit he will make from selling cigarettes to minors to decide if he should comply with the laws. 20 ' This means that a large
fine will not reduce youth smoking at all if there is no enforcement.
The most effective means of enforcement would be unannounced
government inspections, which are one way to discourage retailers
from selling to minors if they are done in sufficient quantity and with
regularity and if the fines are high enough. This type of enforcement
has been used in Washington20220and in Illinois.2 °3
Another way to implement direct monitoring is to get the community involved, possibly by erecting a sign that includes a toll-free
number that a witness can call if she sees a store violating the underage tobacco sales laws. 2° Community monitoring such as this might
prove more successful than government monitoring because greater
enforcement might occur due to the majority of adults (smokers and
nonsmokers alike) who support measures that will keep youth from
smoking.2 °5
Finally, states have the power to monitor who purchases tobacco
products by using devices such as digitalization, holograms, and
large-print dates on drivers' licenses. These could aid clerks in deciding if the person attempting a tobacco purchase is over eighteen, and
20 6
it can also help with the detection of fraudulent drivers' licenses.
'99 Joseph R. DiFranza et al., A Comparisonof the Advertising and Accessibility of Cigars,
Cigarettes, Chewing Tobacco, and Loose Tobacco, 29 PREVENTIVE MED. 321, 322, 324
(1999)("Cigarettes have long been the most commonly shoplifted item.") Id. at 324.
200 NICHOLSON, supra note 114, at 168.
201 See id. (illustrating how expected value can be determined by multiplying the possible
outcomes); see also COMM. ON KIDS AND TOBACCO, REPORT OF THE OREGON ATrORNEY
GENERAL 8 (2001), available at http://www.doj.state.or.us/ags07425.pdf [hereinafter OREGON
REPORT] (listing benefits that the merchant can receive from selling cigarettes to minors as
profits, social reinforcement from minors, and avoidance of averse reactions when customers
are asked to show identification).
202 WASH. STATE DEP'T OF HEALTH, PUB. No. RCW 70.155, MINORS' ACCESS TO TO-

BACCO 1 (1995).
03 ILL. LIQUOR CONTROL COMM'N, KIDS CAN'T BUY 'EM HERE 1 (2000).

204 IMPLEMENTING THE SYNAR REGULATION, supra note 2, at 12.

205Id. at 6-7. See also OREGON REPORT, supra note 201, at 8 (stating that the costs of
selling to minors could include loss of business from those in the community).
206 See NAT'L ASS'N OF GOVERNORS' HIGHWAY SAFETY REPORTS & NAT'L ASS'N OF
STATE ALCOHOL AND DRUG ABUSE DiR., PROMISING APPROACHES IN THE PREVENTION OF

226
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Ohio currently permits the use of a transaction scan device that can
check the validity of a license. 20 7 However, there is a low use rate of
these devices and others, such as systems that require clerks to enter
birthdays before cigarette transactions can be completed. This is most
likely due to a lack of consistency in the standards from state to
state. 08
D. Conduct Laws
The Court in Lorillard said that states still have the power to
prohibit the sale of cigarettes to minors and some common inchoate
offenses that accompany that sale, such as solicitation, conspiracy,
and attempt.2 ° In fact, Congress even encourages this action, making
such prohibition a condition to receiving federal funds for substance
abuse treatment programs through the use of the Synar Amendment. 210 This amendment requires states to enact laws prohibiting
tobacco sales to minors, but it also mandates that states enforce these
laws, which is the current deficiency in compliance.2 11 Although
conduct laws sometimes seem ineffective individually, laws are useful tools because they have practical authority; people obey the laws
because they think they should.21 2 States can use conduct laws to decrease youth smoking rates by (1) controlling minors' use and exposure to cigarettes, (2) enacting stronger laws prohibiting sales to
youth, (3) regulating tobacco products, and (4) increasing enforcement and penalties for existing laws.
First, banning the use of cigarettes, by minors or by others, is
one way to address the problem of youth smoking. One possible idea,
suggested in the 1994 Surgeon General's Report, is to ban smoking
by anyone on school grounds, a plan that embraces the idea that
schools can play a large role in discouraging tobacco use in youth.213
This approach could be a useful tool because minors would be less
frequently exposed to smoking and would thus be less inclined to use

UNDERAGE DRINKING 32-33 (1995) (citing use of a similar program in Virginia as a means of
curbing underage drinking).
207 COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE TOBACCO RETAILING, OHIO LAWS AND REGULATIONS,

(last visited Sept. 1, 2002) [hereinafter OHIO LAWS].
at http://www.wecard.orgIPages/ohio.html
2
0E See OREGON REPORT, supra note 201, at 7-8 (listing diverse systems, computer advances, and costs of acquisition as reasons that such technology is not more widely used).
209 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 552 (2001).
20 42 U.S.C. § 300x-26(a)(1) (2000). Justice Thomas agreed with this idea in his Lorillard
concurrence, suggesting that states should directly regulate conduct itself, instead of regulating
the advertisement of cigarettes. 533 U.S. at 586 (Thomas, J., concurring).
211 IMPLEMENTING THE SYNAR REGULATION, supranote 2, at 2.
212 Robert A. Kagan & Jerome H. Skolnick, Banning Smoking: Compliance Without Enforcement, in SMOKING POLICY, supra note 153, at 69, 69.
213 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supra note 8, at 210-11.
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2 14
tobacco because of the perception that adults are not using it.
Teachers and staff will probably object to this method, however,
based on freedom of choice.215 However, this plan has many benefits,
including limitation of youth exposure to environmental tobacco
smoke (ETS).2 16 The 2001 report of the Oregon Attorney General
commented as follows:

Establishment of smokefree workplaces and schools is effective because it protects kids from second-hand smoke, reduces adult modeling of smoking behaviors, reinforces addicted children's efforts to quit, reduces opportunities for tobacco product advertising and promotion, counters the notion
that many people smoke and that tobacco products are generally accepted by society, and prevents addiction due to environmental smoke exposure.
This method for reducing youth smoking could possibly be carried out by requiring schools to become no-smoking zones as a condition to receiving government funding. Restrictions on public smoking, such as the Minnesota Clean Indoor Air Act,21 8 could probably
achieve similar goals.
Many states have laws relating to tobacco use by minors. Louisiana, for example, makes it illegal for youth to possess tobacco.2 19
Minnesota prohibits inchoate offenses, including ingestion, purchase,
and attempt to purchase, in an effort to combat youth smoking.22 °
California has a similar law, prohibiting purchase, receipt, and possession, all of which carry a $75 fine or thirty hours of community
service work for violations. 221 Alabama makes it illegal for a minor
214 See Tobacco Advertising and Children Hearing, supra note 46, at 20 (statement of
Matthew Myers, Executive Vice President and General Counsel, National Center for Tobacco
Free Kids) (advocating a restriction on environmental tobacco smoke to discourage negative
role models).
215 Kagan & Nelson, supra note 180, at 11, 35 ("American public opinion seems to be
remarkably stable on one fundamental point - the right of adults to choose to smoke if they
wish.").
216 Many states have laws restricting indoor smoking in public places, although challenges
can be made as to when, how, and in what circumstances states can regulate without interfering
with the right to use a legal product. Peter D. Jacobson & Lisa M. Zapawa, Clean Indoor Air
Restrictions:Progressand Promise, in REGULATING TOBACCO, supranote 45, at 207, 207. But
see id. at 210 ("Limiting the public spaces where an individual can smoke is not a significant
intrusion upon individual liberties, especially when balanced against the public's right to breathe
clean air.").
237 OREGON REPORT, supra note 201, at 15.
218 MINN. STAT. §§ 144.411-144.417 (2000). See, e.g., Vango Media, Inc. v. City of New

York, 34 F.3d 68, 74 (2d Cir. 1994) (stating that Congress never meant to diminish traditional
state police power in the area of prohibiting smoking in public places).
219 LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:911, 14:91.8 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002).
220 MINN. STAT. § 609.685 (2000).
221 CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (West Supp. 2002).
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to purchase, use, possess, or transport tobacco within the state, for
minors to falsely represent that they are eighteen or older, and for an
adult to aid and abet a minor's purchase of cigarettes.22 2

Second, states can make it illegal for a merchant to sell cigarettes
to people under age eighteen and then fine the storeowners who continue selling to minors.223 Many states have these laws,224 which are
important because 52% of youth ages twelve to fifteen and 69% of
youth ages sixteen to seventeen buy their own cigarettes. 225 The
Court in Lorillard found that states could prohibit self-service displays to limit youth access. 226 In a study that interviewed merchants
about their perception of the tobacco laws, only 19% of the merchants
reported that they believed the laws prohibiting sales to minors were
effective in their stores.227 The article suggested that one approach
that would discourage merchants from selling to minors would be to
have community programs that would monitor sales to minors; this
would control the storeowners more effectively because they depend
on community support for their businesses. 228 Incentives for merchants might be another way to discourage sales to minors. 229 A
mandatory reporting provision, forcing retailers to report when a minor attempts to purchase cigarettes, might be another way for the
states to keep teenagers from smoking. However, this might be less
effective because merchants will not have an incentive to report the
attempts, but will instead have a disincentive out of a desire to generate profits for themselves.
States have many laws prohibiting sales of cigarettes to minors
and some states are trying to strengthen their laws. Louisiana, for
example, makes it an offense to sell or serve tobacco to anyone under
age eighteen, imposing a fine of $50 for the first offense.23 ° California's fine is considerably higher, with $200 being charged for the first
offense and a $1000 fine being levied for the third offense. California
222 ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 20-x-24-.01 (1999).
223

See, e.g., Vango Media, Inc., 34 F.3d at 74 (stating that Congress never meant to dimin-

ish traditional state police power in the area of restricting cigarette sales). Enforcement is often
made difficult, though, by laws that require a knowing or intentional sale. See Tobacco Advertising and Children Hearing, supra note 46, at 66 (1999) (statement of Joseph R. DiFranza,

University of Massachusetts Medical Center, on behalf of Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco).
224

See, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 163.575 (2001).

225 IMPLEMENTING THE SYNAR REGULATION, supra note 2, at 6.

226Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 569 (2001).
227 Carolyn C. Voorhees et al., Reducing Cigarette Sales to Minors in an Urban Setting:
Issues and Opportunitiesfor Merchant Intervention, 14 AM. J. PREVENTIVE MED, at 138, 140
(1998).
228 Id. at 140-41. See also discussion supra Part III.C.
229 See OREGON REPORT, supra note 201, at 18 (suggesting that a way to discourage sales
to minors is to reward compliant clerks with small gifts or public recognition).
230LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 26:911, 14:91.8 (West 2001 & Supp. 2002).
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also provides for a separate fine when stores fail to post required
signs that state the age requirement for purchasing tobacco. 23 1 Minnesota prohibits the selling of tobacco or tobacco-related devices to
minors.
Tennessee prohibits conduct by banning sale and providing for unannounced inspections of tobacco retail establishments.233
Alabama also has far-reaching conduct laws, making it unlawful for
someone to sell, furnish, give, or purchase tobacco for a minor.234 235
Third, states can regulate the cigarette products themselves.
States can mandate the disclosure of additives and toxic substances in
cigarettes. This was recently done in Massachusetts, by a law requiring tobacco manufacturers to give the state department of public
health an annual report disclosing the identity of any "added constituent" and the nicotine yield rating for the product.236 The law was upheld in Philip Morris, Inc. v. Reilly.237 A possible challenge to this
type of law is that it requires disclosure of trade secrets. Although the
Massachusetts law has a provision that allows manufacturers to refrain from disclosing the specific amount of an ingredient as long as
the FDA has approved that ingredient as safe when burned or inhaled,238 it does not provide a specific protection for trade secrets, as a
similar Texas statute does.239 The United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit still found that no taking of property occurred by the
implementation of the Massachusetts law because the manufacturers
did not lose all economically beneficial use of their property, and, in
return for submitting the required data, the manufacturers received the
benefit of being able to market their products in the state. 240 At least
one court has also found that cigarette ingredients are discoverable in
tort suits, even if the ingredients are viewed as trade secrets. 24 1
231

CAL. PENAL CODE § 308 (West Supp. 2002).

232 MINN. STAT.
233
234

§ 609.685 (2000).

TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-17-1502 (1994).
ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 20-x-24-.01 (1999).

2-5 See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 523 (1992) (finding that the
FCLAA does not generally preempt "state-law obligations to avoid marketing cigarettes with
manufacturing defects or to use a demonstrably safer alternative design for cigarettes") (quoting
respondents' brief).
236 MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 94, § 307B (2001).
237 Nos. 00-2425, 00-2449, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22348 (1st Cir. Oct. 16, 2001) (originally published in advance sheet at 267 F.3d 45, but withdrawn from bound volume at request
of court) (upholding the Massachusetts law despite challenges of categorical and regulatory
takings of trade secrets).
2f8 Ch. 94, § 307B.
239 See TEX. HEALTH AND SAFETY CODE ANN. § 161.354(d) (Vernon 2001) (requiring that
reported information be kept confidential if "the information would be excepted from public
disclosure as a trade secret under state or federal law").
240 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 22348, at *25, *34.
241 See Am. Tobacco Co. v. Evans, 508 So. 2d 1057 (Miss. 1987) (holding that the information was discoverable in a wrongful death action).
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Fourth, states can increase penalties and enforcement of youth
smoking laws. It may seem that states already have sufficient conduct laws to address the problem of underage smoking. However,
conduct laws have limits; youth can get around some of these laws
simply by shoplifting cigarettes or getting them from friends or relatives.
It is evident that increased penalties and enforcement need to
occur, 243 as youth smoking is still a major problem in the United
States.2 4 Stricter penalties are needed for violations, penalizing both
retailers who sell to minors and minors who purchase cigarettes.2 45
And the states need to heighten enforcement, the most serious deficiency in underage smoking laws.246

Insufficient penalties are also a problem. Of the twenty-eight
states that specify fine amounts, the median minimum fine is $2.50,
and the median maximum fine is $50. Penalties involving higher
fines or community service duties might prove more successful, as
they are more relevant to youth.247 Ohio is an example of a state that
has a lenient tobacco law: in that state, there is an exception to the
illegality of underage purchasing of cigarettes if the child has a legal
guardian, parent, or adult spouse with her.248 But some states are trying to make their underage tobacco laws stronger. In Oregon, for instance, judges can suspend a minor's driver's license for up to one
year for attempting to purchase tobacco by misrepresenting his age. 249
Another creative penalty is to use more teen courts, where an attorney acts as judge and the teenage smoker's peers act as prosecutors. 250 Creative punishment for the youth, such as mandatory tobacco education upon violation, might also help the problem.25 1 In242 JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 206. See also OREGON REPORT, supra note 201, at
11 (noting that youth also get cigarettes from adults who are on their way into a store and that
cigarettes are often left unattended at home by parents or other adults).
243 See discussion supra Part
III.C.
2" See Clark et al., supra note 195, at 729 ("In 1999, it was estimated that 3.76 million
daily smokers aged 12 to 17 years consume an estimated 924 million packs of cigarettes per
year, generating a retail value of $1.86 billion.").
245 This idea was posed by David S. Versfelt, who suggested that
retailers who sell to
minors should lose their licenses and that minors who buy cigarettes should have to undergo
forced educational programs or have their drivers' licenses removed. Placing Restraints on
Tobacco's Endangerment of Children and Teens Act: Hearing on S. 1530 Before the Senate
Comm. on the Judiciary, 105th Cong. 40 (1998) (prepared statement of David S. Versfelt,
American Association of Advertising Agencies and Freedom to Advertise Coalition).
246

See IMPLEMENTING THE SYNAR REGULATION, supra note 2, at 6 (noting that states have

laws to prevent youth smoking, but that these laws are underenforced).
247 Rigotti, supra note 190, at 167.
24 OHIO LAWS, supra note 207 (allowing an exception to the illegality of purchasing cigarettes if the child has a legal guardian, parent, or adult spouse with her).
249 OR. REV. STAT. § 167.401(3)(b) (2001).
25
See JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 213 (discussing possible effectiveness of the

620 peer courts in the United States).
. IMPLEMENTING THE SYNAR REGULATION,

supra note 2, at 15.
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creasing the age at which people can buy tobacco to nineteen or
twenty-one might help stem the number of young people who
smoke.2 5 z The Department of Health and Human Services has recommended a civil penalty for youth who violate these laws, as opposed to a criminal one. The agency believes that this will result in
better enforcement of the laws because (1) a cooperative endeavor to
enforce can exist between agencies and the police, (2) judges will be
more likely to impose a civil penalty as opposed to a harsher criminal
penalty, and (3) the criminal justice system will not bear the cost of
enforcement.2 53
E. Prevention Programs
Prevention programs are heralded in the literature as being successful ways of encouraging youth to abstain from using tobacco
products.254 Many states have these programs, although the specifics
of the programs' goals and methods of implementation vary by
state.255 Common program components include counteradvertising,
passage of excise taxes, education, and youth leadership.
One part of prevention programs is often counteracting tobacco
advertising by using speech that warns of the dangers of cigarette
smoking. Justice Thomas advocated this course of action in his Lorillard concurrence.256 Counteradvertising was also used in the 1994
campaign in Arizona that was aimed specifically at youth.257 The
campaign attempted to convince youth that not smoking was "cool"
by getting youth to adopt an anti-smoking learning process, instead of
a smoking one.258 The program reached young people in effective
ways, using television, radio, and mall booths to get its message to the
children. 259 The effectiveness of the campaign was unquestioned. In
fact, when a telephone survey was done, 61% of youth could recall
252 DEP'T OF LEGISLATIVE SERV.,

OFFICE OF POLICY ANALYSIS, TEEN SMOKING AND

TOBACCO TAXES 6 (1998).

2" Id. at 13.
2

See, e.g., IMPLEMENTING THE SYNAR REGULATION, supra note 2, at 25 (advocating a

multi-pronged program, where the strategies can support each other).
25 Compare N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 1399-ii (McKinney 2001) (using school-based
programs, tobacco cessation programs, and surveillance of smoking rates), with Connolly &
Robbins, supra note 198, at 2722-23 (discussing state program that funds local efforts, runs a
Smoker's Quitline, and utilizes boards of health and community coalitions).
256 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 586 (2001) (Thomas, J., concurring).
257 Tim Riester & Mirja Linton, Designing an Effective Counteradvertising Campaign Arizona, 83 CANCER 2746-47 (1998).
'5 Id. at 2747-49. After finding that youth smoked because they thought it was trendy, the
program coordinators used statements in their ads that addressed issues teenagers find importan, such as "Tobacco pushes the opposite sex away"; "Tobacco and sports don't mix"; and
"Your family will suffer if you use tobacco." Id.
59 Id. at 2749.
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the slogan without prompting, and 26% of current users said that the
ads helped them decide to quit. 260 This campaign was very effective
because the coordinators made an effort to relate to the youth. 261 The
campaign was also successful because it was executed in an efficient
way.262
Counteradvertising can raise some First Amendment issues,
however: "If government expression and secrecy can sometimes
serve the same functions as direct government censorship, then, logically, sources of limitation of government communication abuses may
be sought in the First Amendment ...., In Meese v. Keene,26 the
Supreme Court found that a federal law requiring certain foreign
films to be called "political propaganda" was constitutional because
the usage of the term was neutral and did not prevent the showing of
such films in the United States.265 Therefore, a counterspeech challenge to smoking messages might be overcome by using neutral terminology. Also, it is unlikely that a challenge to counteradvertising
would succeed, as long as the state uses counterspeech through its
agencies or as a part of a youth smoking prevention plan, without
passing a law that mandates the use of counteradvertising.
In addition to using counteradvertising, excise taxes are often a
second component used in conjunction with prevention programs to
make both more effective. Often, a certain percentage of the proceeds
from the excise tax will be used to start a prevention program. For
example, Oregon used 10% of the additional revenue created by an
excise tax to fund its tobacco prevention program. 266 A study done in

Id. at 2750.
Id. The main slogan used for the nontobacco brand was "Tobacco, Tumor-Causing,
Teeth-Staining, Smelly, Puking Habit," a combination of ways in which youth in the survey
described tobacco. Id.
262 Id. at 2748, 2750. The first television commercial was aired during the
Super Bowl and
was followed the next day by a press conference. The nontobacco brand (a consistent way of
portraying smoking abstention, complete with icons, symbols, and attributes) was placed on
merchandise, and a Hummer was used to pull the Ashkicker, an interactive exhibit that begins
with a walk-up tongue. Id. at 2750.
263 MARK G. YUDOF, WHEN GOVERNMENT SPEAKS 158 (1983). But see Kathleen
J. Lester, Note, Cowboys, Camels, and Commercial Speech: Is the Tobacco Industry's Commodification of ChildhoodProtected by the FirstAmendment?, 24 N. KY. L. REV. 615, 638 (1997) (asserting that distortions in the market cause it to fail, and that it is the government's job to fix this
problem).
264 481 U.S. 465,484-85 (1987).
265But see Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 72 (1963) (holding that actions of
a Rhode Island agency that educated the public about anything containing impure language were
unconstitutional because agency worked with suspected violators in "a scheme of state censorship.., as an agency not to advise but to suppress").
266B. Pizacani et al., Decline in Cigarette Consumption Following Implementation of a
Comprehensive Tobacco Prevention and EducationProgram- Oregon, 1996-1998, 281 JAMA
1483, 1483 (1999).
260
261
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Massachusetts concluded that an antismoking campaign used in conjunction with an excise tax can be more effective than the tax alone.267
Education is usually the third part of prevention programs. One
study determined that "[d]epending solely on merchants, youth, and
enforcement activities is unlikely to reduce youth access to cigarettes. 26 8 This is most likely a result of the lack of incentive for merchants and youth to comply with the laws and the dearth of enforcement.2 69 The authors of the above study instead suggest a community-driven educational method with "[m]ajor comprehensive policy
initiatives" that involve government at all levels to counteract cigarette advertising.27 °
If an antismoking campaign is going to be successful with respect to the youth population, it needs to address the problem in a
way that youth will understand.27 ' Some innovative ideas for tailoring a tobacco eaucation program to minors include using computerbased communication 272 and using fun activities to learn about tobacco, such as conducting lab experiments to show the harmful effects of smoking, putting on plays, and allowing older kids to teach
younger ones.273 Since children may no longer listen to or be affected
by smoking ads after they are age twelve or thirteen, 274 counteradvertising and education methods should be directed at younger children.275
276
A fourth important part of education can be youth leadership.
Changing attitudes about tobacco, reducing underage tobacco access,
and encouraging youth leadership in the antismoking campaign were
focuses of a successful Florida program. This program had positive
results: current cigarette use declined by 40% among children in

267

Harris et al., supra note 128, at 970 (extrapolating from the fact that cigarette consump-

tion continued to decline when an industry price-reduction counteracted the excise tax); but see
Nicholl, supra note 111, at 2675 (stating that no reduction in adolescent smoking has occurred
in California or Massachusetts as a result of their tobacco control programs).
268 Voorhees et al., supra note 227, at 142.
269 See discussion supra Parts II.C., IlI.D.
270 Voorhees et al., supra note 227, at 138, 142.
271 Nicholl, supra note 111, at 2748 (deciding not to use health concerns as part of the
message because health effects do not happen immediately and therefore have little effect on a
teenager's decision to smoke).
272 JACOBSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 141, 143 (suggesting that this practice would allow
teenagers
to get the information without having to ask their parents).
23
7 AM. ASS'N FOR HEALTH, PHYSICAL EDUC. & RECREATION, WHAT EDUCATORS CAN
Do ABOUT CIGARETrE SMOKING 13-15, 18-20 (1971).

274 Peracchio & Luna, supra note 25, at 218.
275 See id. at 225 (suggesting the use of analogies involving smoking and things children

are familiar with).
276 See, e.g., Ursula E. Bauer et al., Changes in Youth Cigarette Use and Intentions Following Implementation of a Tobacco Control Program,284 JAMA 723, 723 (2000).
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middle school and by 18% among high school students between 1998
and 2000.277
Different combinations of these four facets-counteradvertising,
excise taxes, education, and youth leadership-have proven useful in
many states to reduce the rate of youth cigarette consumption. 278 For
example, in Oregon, where many methods, including an excise tax,
education, school-based programs, and a quitter's helpline, were used
in the prevention program, the per capita rate of consumption decreased by 11.3% between 1996 and 1998.279 A similar 2rogram in
Massachusetts yielded results that were almost as positive.
CONCLUSION

"There should be no illusions as to the dangers of cigarettes.
The combination of a highly addictive, pharmacologically active substance-nicotine-and an array of noxious chemicals cunningly
packaged in a highly efficient delivery mechanism can permanently
and drastically affect health. 281 States need to exercise their police
power to protect children from this substance. The FCLAA is a lenient law and it preempts states from taking more definitive action.
Because of this, some people say that the FCLAA actually harms the
fight against underage smoking.
Many different approaches can be taken to fight against teenage
smoking. The Supreme Court has determined: "To the extent that
federal law and the First Amendment do not prohibit state action,
States and localities remain free to combat the problem of underage
tobacco use by appropriate means. 2 83 Of the numerous methods
available to states, the Surgeon General has determined that "a coordinated, multicomponent campaign involving policy changes, taxation, mass media, and behavioral education can effectively reduce the
onset of tobacco use among adolescents. '2 84 It is time for states to

277

278

Id. at 725.
Pizacani et al., supra note 266, at 1484 ("The decline in cigarette consumption in Ore-

gon, California, and Massachusetts indicates that an adequately funded, comprehensive tobaccocontrol program can quickly and substantially reduce tobacco use.").
279 Id. at 1484 ("Despite a 2.7% increase in the state's population, 25 million fewer cigarette packs were sold in Oregon in 1998 than in 1996.").
280 Through this program, Massachusetts' youth smoking rate stayed almost the same,
while the nation's rate greatly increased. Connolly & Robbins, supra note 198, at 2724-25.
281 BRODISH, supra note 6, at 12.
282 See Correia, supra note 99, at 1 (asserting that states will enact stricter tobacco laws
than the federal government will).
283 Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 571 (2001).
284 SURGEON GENERAL'S REPORT, supranote 8, at 8. A study by the Centers for Disease
Control has shown a drop in high school smoking rates from 36.4% to 28.5% in the last five
years. Erin McClam, High Prices Said to Cut Teen Smoking: CDC Also Credits Education
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take action to protect minors from the harmful repercussions of cigarette smoking.
JAMIE PEAL KAVEt

Efforts, BOSTON GLOBE, May 17, 2002, at A2. The CDC credits this decrease to a combination
of school programs and high cigarette taxes. Id.
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